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critically ill children  
 
In his book Death or Disability? The ‘Carmentis machine’ and decision-making for critically 
ill children Dominic Wilkinson presents his “threshold framework”, as the first step towards 
developing more detailed guidelines for treatment decisions for children who may have 
severe disabilities.  His philosophical approach and his basic assumptions are not new. With 
slight modification they seem broadly in line with those of Michael Tooley, Jeff McMahan, 
Julian Savulescu, Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer. Moreover his thresholds share similarities 
with the criteria used in the Groningen Protocol for euthanasia of newborns (p.298). 
However, given that Wilkinson appears to speak out of practical medical experience rather 
than abstract thinking and that he has presented much the same line of thought in several 
other publications, this book requires both serious and critical reading.  A discerning 
approach to this book and its underlying assumptions is even more pressing since Wilkinson 
benignly states that he offers a framework that is not based on “mere whims” or the opinion 
of single individuals but on “considered, reasoned judgments of a community caring for sick 
children and infants” (p.288).   
 
In Part I of his book Wilkinson pairs a story from ancient Rome with one from the future to 
introduce his imaginary Carmentis machine that gives an accurate prognosis for newborns. 
He can then use philosophy “to develop important distinctions”, “to reflect on the key values 
at stake” and on “key arguments” (p.14) and to focus on what he sees as the “central 
questions” for treatment decisions without having his analysis unnecessarily complicated by 
uncertainty. Having analysed treatment limitation decisions made by competent patients in 
terms of a life not worth living, a state that is so undesirable that the patient would rather die, 
he applies the same quality of life judgment to infants. Examining medical cases and 
healthcare guidelines he decides that the best interests principle, the mainstay of current 
guidelines, is imprecise, vague, difficult to apply and unclear about which impairments are 
sufficiently severe to justify withdrawing treatment. Instead Wilkinson argues that best 
interests essentially refer to worthwhileness of life and since death for an infant is absence of 
experience while continued existence in a life not worth living is a negative experience he 
concludes that in many cases of severe disability, particularly the risk of future severe 
cognitive impairment, continued life is not in the child’s best interests (p.248).  
 
Concerned that the current best interests principle leaves no role for parental decision-making 
Wilkinson addresses the interests of family members. Having accepted without question that 
infants are replaceable and that replacement is significant only regarding the interests of other 
family members (p.108) he concludes that life-sustaining treatment can sometimes be 
withdrawn for mild and moderate disability (pp101-102). Where there is “potential conflict or 
competition” between family interests and the child’s interests (p.125) Wilkinson claims that 
newborns have a relatively weak interest in continued life, though this grows stronger with 
age, so this can be outweighed by family interests. He adds that this is “most likely” the case 
for infants with severe impairment (p.151). Although he briefly notes some possibly positive 
impacts on the family of the birth of a disabled child, Wilkinson takes considerable time to 
detail the negative consequences, burdens and therefore the considerable harm to the family 
and the harm of a continued life of negative experiences for the child. Notably the only 
situation where the child’s interests are stronger than its parents is where the child’s 
‘interests’ favour the withdrawal of treatment (p.151). 
 
Having set out his philosophical argument unclouded by uncertainty Wilkinson says that even 
if a “Carmentis machine” existed that could eliminate prognostic uncertainty there would still 
be “moral uncertainty” about how good or bad severe conditions are and what ought to be 
done, as well as “ethical uncertainty” about which rules or theories to apply. Wilkinson 
responds to these uncertainties in Part II with his “threshold framework”, a system that 
retains an important role for ‘best interests’, as Wilkinson interprets them, and a lesser role 
for parental wishes.  At the “upper threshold” where prognosis for the child is sufficiently 
good treatment must be provided even if against the wishes of the parents. This threshold 
protects some disabled children with mild cognitive impairment. At the “lower threshold” 
where prognosis is poor life-sustaining treatment should not be provided even if parents 
request it (p.271). There is a “grey zone” between the lower and upper thresholds where 
parental discretion holds more weight principally because of the combination of prognostic 
and moral uncertainty. The lower threshold fits Wilkinson’s claim that survival is not in the 
best interests of a child with possible future cognitive impairment – death is preferable to 
severe intellectual disability – even if the child’s life is deemed to be worth living. According 
to Wilkinson a “life worth living” is related to well-being which includes the potential to 
have desires and preferences fulfilled (pp.84-85). An infant who has severe cognitive 
impairment will simply not be able to rise above the lower threshold and even if the infant 
would appear to have pleasurable experiences the ‘prognosis’ would never be good enough.  
 
Wilkinson seems keen to overrule carers who think that a life of severe impairment, 
particularly intellectual disability, is still a life worth living. He argues that the profoundly 
disabled themselves cannot affirm this, that carers are often biased in their assessments and 
that crucially we cannot take into account the views of the profoundly disabled who are dead 
and so possibly ‘better off’. Certainly he says that where there is disagreement about whether 
treatment is in the interests of the child then choice motivated by the interests of the parents 
may be given more weight. But it could still be overridden if that choice is likely to cause 
“substantial harm” (p.258). And for Wilkinson families are inevitably harmed by the birth of 
a severely disabled child moreover, since his argument rests on predicted quality of life in 
many cases continued life for the infant is more harmful than death (p.217). Furthermore 
Wilkinson claims that a “keep-alive mistake”, where while waiting for a clearer prognosis life 
turns out to be not worth living, is more serious than a “let-die mistake”. So he suggests that 
“we should therefore choose a higher threshold in the face of uncertainty for decisions about 
treatment”, a cut off point above where benefits and burdens balance (p.248). 
 
 
Specifically Wilkinson appears to be interested in when treatment can be withheld or 
withdrawn so that infants can be allowed to die. He makes the case both for infants in 
intensive care and later on at “windows of opportunity” when infants and older children may 
“no longer be physiologically dependent on intensive care treatments” (p.204) but where the 
withdrawal of hydration and nutrition, “a sanctioned alternative” to euthanasia, could be 
appropriate (p.231). Wilkinson does not rule out euthanasia indeed he sees the issues raised 
for euthanasia as essentially the same as those for treatment limitation (p.34) hence perhaps 
his few pages on infanticide and exposure in ancient Rome. To be sure Wilkinson’s 
framework does not lead to the withdrawal of life support from children “with a reasonable 
chance of a good life” (p.303). However he believes that “the great advantage” of his 
threshold framework is that it does not commit to saying that there are lives that are not worth 
living (p.296). He is clear that children with severe impairment do have interests (albeit weak 
ones), they can be benefited or harmed and their lives may hold some meaning for them. 
Nevertheless if there is “clear and convincing evidence” that a child will have severe 
impairment, and this probability is “less stringent than beyond reasonable doubt”, or there is 
evidence that “continued treatment” (or possibly life?) would harm the child then treatment 
should not be provided even if parents request it and even if from the child’s perspective life 
is worthwhile (p.294).  
 
 
Wilkinson’s account is well-argued but seriously problematic. Despite his claims to develop 
important distinctions and to reflect on key values and arguments he is uncritical of and over 
reliant on assumptions that are broadly utilitarian. He does not ask deeper questions. 
Although he acknowledges that his balance sheet approach to the best interests test is not 
truly objective (p.77) there is no mention of the patient’s clinical best interest or interest in 
care that is delivered effectively and with respect. The patient’s interest in not being killed 
intentionally is belittled. Wilkinson cursorily dismisses any challenge to his view that 
decisions should be made on quality or worth of life and he misdescribes any counter 
argument as vitalist thus indicating a lack of appreciation for the Christian, specifically the 
Catholic perspective (p.27). This is further evident in his misapprehension of Clark’s position 
(p.220). Wilkinson includes a lengthy discussion of the principle of double effect, he revises 
it to fit in with the ‘window of opportunity’ and then says that there are “good reasons” to 
doubt whether we should be bound by it, because, after all he acknowledges that death is 
intended and this automatically violates the principle (p.217). Importantly Wilkinson does not 
think his arguments are discriminatory or at least he concludes that “not all discrimination is 
the same, and not all discrimination is problematic” (p.54). His title says it all: ‘death or 
disability?’ Instead of disability being another way of living a human life, for Wilkinson it is 
worse than being dead. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
